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Abstract
We explore how adults learn counterintuitive causal relation-
ships, and whether they discover hypotheses by revising their
beliefs incrementally. We examined how adults learned a novel
and unusual causal rule when presented with data that initially
appeared to conform to a simpler, more salient rule. Adults
watched a video of several blocks placed sequentially on a
blicket detector, and were then asked to determine the under-
lying causal structure. In the near condition the true rule was
complex, but could be found by making incremental improve-
ments to the simple and salient initial hypothesis. The distant
condition was governed by a simpler rule, but to adopt that rule
participants had to set aside their initial beliefs, rather than
revising them incrementally. Adults performed better in the
near condition, despite this rule being more complex, provid-
ing some of the first evidence for an explore-exploit trade-off
in inference, analogous to the trade-off in active learning.
Keywords: causality, Bayesian inference, hypothesis search,
process model
Background
Any time we make plans, predict the future, or attempt to
understand why events occurred in the past, we are rely-
ing on causal knowledge. In acquiring this knowledge, we
must draw conclusions from sparse, noisy, and ambiguous
evidence. To make sense of these kinds of data, we must
have abstract beliefs, sometimes described as overhypothe-
ses, about what kinds of causal relationships are more plau-
sible than others. We begin to form these hypotheses at an
early age, with causal thinking showing signs of emergence
even in infancy (Sobel & Kirkham, 2006; 2007; Walker &
Gopnik, 2014). By adulthood, our frameworks for interpret-
ing causal phenomena become much more complex and able
to accommodate diverse areas of knowledge (Kemp, Good-
man, & Tenenbaum, 2007).
Despite their usefulness, sometimes these causal expecta-
tions can lead us astray, as in the case where we encounter a
new causal relationship that is rare or strange by the standards
of our past experience. For instance, we might expect that ei-
ther of two switches will turn on a lamp, when in fact the
lamp turns on when the switches are in matched positions.
While our causal learning process is generally accurate and
adaptive (e.g., Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005), in the current
paper we claim – in the spirit of previous “rational process”
models (e.g. Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010) – that hu-
man causal beliefs are updated in a limited or local fashion
that is efficient but subject to systematic failures under certain
conditions. This is especially true when the true causal struc-
ture is distant from our initial hypothesis in some hypothe-
sis space. Suppose you break out in a rash every time you
buy your favourite candy bar from a vending machine. After
searching for the proper cause, you would probably conclude
that you are allergic to the candy as soon as it comes to mind.
You may be unlikely to consider that you are actually react-
ing to the coins used to purchase the candy bar, even if this is
indeed the case. In this instance, inferring the proper cause re-
quires looking beyond the most obvious solution, which may
be difficult to accomplish.
Bayesian Models of Causal Inference
Several researchers have attempted to explain learning of
novel causal relationships using hierarchical Bayesian mod-
els of inference (e.g. Griffiths, Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gop-
nik, 2011; Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008). Recent
evidence demonstrates that both adults and children can suc-
cessfully modify their causal beliefs in light of new and sur-
prising evidence in a manner that suggests they are using
a Bayesian inference strategy (e.g., Griffiths, Sobel, Tenen-
baum, & Gopnik, 2011; Lucas, Bridgers, Griffiths, & Gop-
nik, 2014). Through this process, learners can also create and
update higher-level models of how causal relationships oper-
ate in general. Regardless of whether human cognition func-
tions exactly in this manner, hierarchical Bayesian models
have been shown to accurately predict causal learning (Kemp,
Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2007; Lu, Yuille, Lijeholm, Cheng,
& Holyoak, 2006; Lucas & Griffiths, 2010).
However, Bayesian inference is often intractable in prac-
tice for complex problems, which may preclude people from
solving them as an ideal Bayesian agent would. Multi-
variable causal inference entails an enormous space of possi-
ble hypotheses; inferring the nature of a relationship between
k binary-valued causes and one effect entails a hypothesis
space with roughly 22
k
entries. As for the process by which
people might make approximately Bayesian inferences given
limited resources, empirical phenomena such as order effects
offer hints. If learners are making inferences from a com-
plete set of data, as traditional Bayesian models assume, then
they should not be influenced by the order in which stimuli
are presented. Nevertheless, studies with inference problems
show that phenomena such as order effects and anchoring
are prevalent (Danks & Schwartz, 2006; Sanborn, Griffiths,
& Navarro, 2010). This suggests that people arrive at so-
lutions by considering a small number of hypotheses at any
single moment in time, and updating or replacing them se-
quentially as more data become available – sometimes losing
information and leading to small but systematic errors. More
recently, Bayesian process models have been proposed to ex-
plain these patterns of errors by drawing analogies to infer-
ence algorithms that permit tractable and efficient inference
in applied statistics and machine learning. (Abbott, Hamrick,
& Griffiths, 2013; Shi, Griffiths, Feldman, & Sanborn, 2010).
Although existing Bayesian models can accommodate cer-
tain biases, they may not fully account for adults’ relative
difficulties in learning more unusual types of causal relation-
ships. Specifically, Lucas and colleagues (2014) found that
young children were more likely than adults to discover an
unusual conjunctive causal relationship. Children and adults
were tasked with inferring a causal principle after viewing
a machine that activated when certain blocks or block com-
binations were placed on top of it. Even after viewing evi-
dence that blocks only activated the machine in specific pairs
(and not individually), adults had more difficulty than chil-
dren with generalizing this principle to new blocks. One
possibility for this finding is that adults are more biased by
prior experiences—as they have observed that conjunctive re-
lationships are relatively rare—which leads them to demand
strong evidence before they infer a conjunctive relationship
is present. Indeed, the mere fact that adults have more prior
experience means that adults have developed a wider range
of overhypotheses related to the kinds of causal relationships
that are likely to exist. If cognition operates via Bayesian
principles, there are conceivably instances in which rigid
commitment to a prior may preclude learners from uncover-
ing the true nature of a causal relationship. However, this may
not apply in novel causal situations with which adults have
limited experience. Moreover, adults are cognitively differ-
ent than children beyond simply having more experience, so
differences in causal reasoning may in fact be the by-product
of some developmental change.
The Explore-Exploit Trade-off in Inference
As an alternative to simply having different priors, adults’
relative difficulty with conjunctive causal relationships may
be explained in terms of the process by which they explore
and weigh new hypotheses in light of their current beliefs. It
is typically not possible to evaluate all potential hypotheses
(of which there may be an infinite number). As a result, we
might expect that people approximate the full posterior by
examining a subset of the full range of hypotheses, and, in
the extreme, considering just one at a time. For example, in
certain causal learning situations, children and adults might
employ “win-stay, lose-shift” (or “lose-sample”) strategies,
whereby consistent evidence may reinforce the hypothesis
over time and inconsistent evidence may trigger belief revi-
sion (Bonawitz, Denison, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2014). These
strategies, as well as other causal learning estimation tech-
niques, are often modelled using Monte Carlo methods that
update sequentially and incrementally. These methods al-
low hypotheses to be revised by sampling from the posterior,
without computing the posterior distribution in its entirety.
Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling algorithms in partic-
ular exhibit a degree of stickiness or inertia, in which they
hew more closely to their initial hypotheses than a truly opti-
mal Bayesian learner would. This family of models predicts
that individuals will tend toward inferences that are similar to
their prior beliefs. For example, one study showed that when
people made inferences about a causal system, they tended
toward solutions that required the fewest single edits to their
initial hypothesis, where a single edit is an addition, subtrac-
tion, or reversal of a causal link (Bramley, Dayan, & Lagnado,
2015). This idea has recently been shown to explain classical
anchoring phenomena (Lieder, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2012).
Therefore, causal process models can account for multiple
limitations on causal learning; learners can be constrained
not only by one’s priors, but also the similarity of candidate
hypotheses to their current beliefs, perhaps precluding them
from even finding hypotheses that are too distant.
Gopnik and colleagues (Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015)
recently conjectured that these inference by sampling mod-
els might explain developmental differences in causal learn-
ing, suggesting that young children’s relative cognitive flex-
ibility may be advantageous when searching for solutions to
causal problems. Greater flexibility may shield children from
cognitive biases present in adults, which would explain chil-
dren’s relatively high performance in Lucas and colleagues’
(2014) study. Therefore, these findings could reflect a cog-
nitive tradeoff in development that affects how children and
adults search through hypotheses. When presented with a
wide range of possibilities, individuals must often decide
whether to employ a general, shallow search or a narrow, deep
one. This is related to the explore-exploit tradeoff, whereby
decision-makers must allocate cognitive resources to either
exploit previous knowledge or explore alternatives (Sutton &
Barto, 1998). From a developmental standpoint, adults may
be more inclined to exploit than children are—and less likely
to explore hypotheses with a greater edit distance from the
current hypothesis—thereby increasing efficiency but poten-
tially limiting access to unusual alternatives.
Thus, the inferential explore-exploit trade-off may have in-
teresting implications for the process of selecting between
competing hypotheses. This selection process has been mod-
elled using Bayesian algorithms for both children and adults
(Bonawitz, Denison, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2014; Denison,
Bonawitz, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2013; Lieder, Griffiths, &
Goodman, 2012; Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010), but
relatively little previous work has examined changes in explo-
ration and exploitation. As one possible example of how hy-
pothesis search may reflect an exploitation bias, researchers
have likened problem-solving development to simulated an-
nealing; just as the heating and gradual cooling of a metal
can increase its malleability, so can a gradual “cooling” of an
inference method corresponding to an increasingly conser-
vative search policy lead to better inferences (Gopnik, Grif-
fiths, & Lucas, 2015; Lucas, Bridgers, Griffiths, & Gopnik,
2014). For instance, while young children may use high-
temperature searches, considering a wide range of hypotheses
with relatively equal probability, adults’ searches are “cooler”
and more narrow in scope. Although commitment to priors
may still play a crucial role, simulated annealing allows us
to examine which types of hypotheses are considered. High-
temperature searches are more likely to discard adequate hy-
potheses, but may allow individuals to escape local optima
and discover unlikely solutions that are potentially better. In
contrast, low-temperature searches can quickly converge to
good solutions if fewer low-probability edits are required to
get there, but may otherwise get trapped in local optima. With
this in mind, adults may have more difficulty with certain un-
usual causal relationships because their search is too focused
and too close to their initial guesses to accommodate distant
ideas. While Lucas and colleagues (2014) suggested the pos-
sibility that children and adults explore the hypothesis space
differently, they did not distinguish it from the idea that adults
simply have stronger priors than children. While both possi-
bilities would result in a tendency for adults to disfavour un-
likely solutions, the ideas function fundamentally differently.
The purpose of our current studies is to test the hypothe-
sis that belief updating in adults is exploitation-biased. To
accomplish this, we designed a task that encouraged partici-
pants to generate a particular initial hypothesis about a novel
causal relationship. Evidence that contradicted this hypothe-
sis was then presented, causing participants to modify their
beliefs. The true causal structure took one of two forms
corresponding to two experimental conditions. In the near
condition, the correct causal structure was closer to the ini-
tial hypothesis but relatively complex. In the distant condi-
tion, the correct causal structure was simpler but unrelated
to the initial hypothesis. Thus, we hoped to determine the
breadth of hypotheses that the participants were willing to en-
tertain. If adults’ search process is more exploitation-biased,
we should expect the near-hypothesis solution would be more
easily found than the distant one, even if both rules are a priori
equally unlikely. However, if adults’ failure to infer unlikely
causal relationships is simply due to the low prior probabil-
ity that they place on these relationships, then they should be
equally unlikely to consider either solution.
Experiment 1: Investigating the
Explore-Exploit Tradeoff in Inference
Participants Participants were 90 adult US residents, re-
cruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid a base
rate of $1 for their time. An additional $1 bonus was given
to the top 10% performers as an additional incentive. Partici-
pants were divided randomly among near (n = 45) and distant
(n = 45) conditions. Six participants from the near condition
and seven from the distant condition were excluded due to
failure to correctly answer attention manipulation tasks.
Materials and Procedure The methods used in this study
are similar to those used in previous blicket tasks (e.g. Gop-
nik & Sobel, 2000), except that animated video stimuli were
presented online using Qualtrics survey software (similar to
Buchsbaum et al., 2012). Participants were asked to examine
several blocks and determine which blocks are blickets. They
were informed that blickets are blocks that activate the blicket
detector, and were shown a video of an animated blicket de-
tector activating and not activating. Participants then watched
a five-minute animation depicting 20 blocks being consecu-
tively placed onto the blicket detector. If the block was a
blicket, the detector lit up and a sound played.
Whether a block was a blicket depended on specific as-
pects of the block pattern. Each block had a coloured back-
ground (red or blue) and several small red or blue triangles
in a fixed pattern (see Figure 1). The block pattern was
such that the background colour was the most obvious and
visually striking feature. For the first 15 blocks (the rule-
consistent blocks), the background colour appeared to deter-
mine whether the blocks activated the machine—i.e. blocks
with one background colour consistently activated the ma-
chine, while the others did not. Inspired by an experimental
manipulation in Williams and Lombrozo (2010; 2013), this
was designed to lead participants to an initial causal hypoth-
esis based on the objects’ most salient feature. The final five
blocks (the rule-violating blocks), however, violated this ini-
tial hypothesis; the blocks that did and did not activate the
machine had the opposite background colour as before. Thus
participants needed to modify their initial hypothesis to cap-
ture the optimal solution. In the near condition, participants
saw 11 blickets (3 rule-violating) and 9 non-blickets (2 rule-
violating). In the distant condition participants saw 10 blick-
ets (2 rule-violating) and 10 non-blickets (3 rule-violating).
The true rule separating blickets from non-blickets var-
ied based on condition. This true rule determined whether
a block was a blicket 100% of the time. In the near condition,
the background colour was related to whether a block was
a blicket, whereas in the distant condition the background
colour was unrelated. Each block had five binary features
(Figure 1), which could vary by colour on each block (back-
ground, corners, centre-left triangle, centre-right triangle, and
border), giving a total of 32 different colour combinations. In
the near condition, blocks were blickets based on a combina-
tion of the background colour and the colour of two secondary
features. In the distant condition, only the colour of these two
secondary features determined whether a block was a blicket,
while the background colour was irrelevant.
Thus, the five features could be labeled as follows: one
primary feature (A), two relevant secondary features (B and
C), and two irrelevant secondary features (D and E). In the
distant condition, the optimal rule for determining whether a
block is a blicket—that is, the simplest rule that perfectly ex-
plains the data—can be written as R= (B ∩ ¬C) ∪ (¬B ∩C),
whereas the optimal rule in the near condition can be written
as R = (A ∩ ¬B) ∪ (¬A ∩ ¬C). In the near condition, there
Figure 1: Examples of blickets in the near condition (left) and
the distant condition (right).
is a consistently-improving path of single edits to transition
from the initial hypothesis, R = A, to the correct rule, where
a single edit consists of adding or subtracting a variable or
changing an operator (e.g. changing R = A to R = A ∩ ¬B;
Goodman & Tenenbaum, 2008 use a similar approach for
searching a hypothesis space). In the distant condition, the
single-edit path to the correct rule requires edits that initially
worsen the hypothesis (e.g. removing A as a relevant vari-
able). If adults use a Bayesian single-edit search process with
an exploit bias, participants should be less likely to abandon
R = A, and thus should perform more poorly in the distant
condition, where R= A is the local optimum.
Following the blicket presentation, participants saw a
blicket rating task, in which they were asked to judge whether
a randomized series of eight blocks were blickets. For each
block, participants rated how certain they were that it was, or
was not, a blicket, on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from
“definitely a blicket” to “definitely not a blicket”. Blocks
were balanced by background colour, blicket/non-blicket sta-
tus, and whether they had already been presented in the ob-
servation stage. Participants received a score between -3 and
3 for each block based on accuracy and certainty, and the sum
of these scores determined their final score for this task.
Next, participants completed a forced-choice task, where
they were asked to choose which of two blocks was more
likely to activate the blicket detector, for a series of four
pairs. Blocks were selected randomly such that there were
an equal number of rule-consistent and rule-violating blocks,
and blocks in each pair differed from each other in back-
ground colour and whether they were a blicket. Participants
received a point for each correct block judgment.
Afterwards, the participants were asked to describe the
causal rule they had inferred. They were then told to imagine
that a new rule was suggested by a friend, and asked if they
preferred this rule over their own. This rule always repre-
sented the correct causal structure. The purpose of this ques-
tion was to ensure that any differences between the two condi-
tions were not due to participants finding the near rule inher-
ently more plausible or likely than the distant one. The par-
ticipants’ rule preference was measured using a seven-point
scale. Finally, each participant received questions to test their
task comprehension and an instructional manipulation task
Table 1: Mean scores and standard error for forced-choice
task. Total scores range from 0 to 4, and scores for rule-
consistent and rule-violating blocks range from 0 to 2.
Condition Near Distant
Total score 2.53(±0.10) 2.24(±0.12)
Rule-consistent 1.90(±0.08) 1.82(±0.07)
Rule-violating 0.77(±0.13) 0.42(±0.07)
Table 2: Mean scores and standard error for blicket rating
task. Total scores range from -24 to 24, and scores in each
sub-category range from -12 to 12.
Condition Near Distant
Total score 8.00(±1.04) 4.87(±1.26)
Rule-consistent 9.59(±0.51) 6.39(±0.72)
Rule-violating -1.59(±1.01) -1.53(±1.06)
to control for inattention, similar to the one used by Oppen-
heimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko (2009).
Results and Discussion If adults’ strategy for hypothesis
search is exploitation-biased, participants in the near condi-
tion will perform better on both tasks than those in the dis-
tant condition. The results supported our predictions. For
the forced-choice task, a 2x2 ANOVA was run with condition
(distant/near) and rule consistency (rule-consistent/violating)
as factors (see Table 1 for a score summary). Participants in
the near condition scored higher than those in the distant con-
dition, F(1, 84) = 6.46, p = .01, MSE = 0.26. Participants
also scored higher for rule-consistent blocks, than for rule-
violating blocks, F(1, 84) = 226, p < .001, MSE = 0.34 (see
Figure 2 for a visual comparison).
For the blicket rating task, a 2x2 mixed ANOVA (condition
x rule consistency) was run (see Table 2 for a score summary).
The analysis found that participants were much more likely to
confidently identify rule-consistent blocks than rule-violating
blocks F(1, 84) = 131, p < .001, MSE = 15.32, suggesting
that the salience manipulation was effective. Supporting our
forced-choice results, there was a marginally significant ef-
fect of condition, F(1, 84) = 3.77, p = .06, MSE = 11.87, with
a mean score of 7.51 for the near condition and 4.63 for the
distant condition (scores ranged from -24 to 24).
Intriguingly, there was also a significant interaction effect,
F(1, 84) = 3.34, p = .04, MSE = 15.32. This is a result of par-
ticipants in the near condition performing better than those
in the distant condition on rule-consistent blocks, but equally
poorly on rule-violating blocks. To assess whether this inter-
action was due to differences in confidence for some blocks,
an additional 2x2 mixed ANOVA (condition x rule consis-
tency) was run to investigate participants’ certainty ratings
when evaluating blocks. Participants were more certain of
their answers when rating rule-consistent blocks than when
Figure 2: Scores on the forced-choice task as a function of
rule consistency. Scores in each category range from 0 to 2.
rating rule-violating blocks, F(1, 84) = 22.0, p < .001, MSE
= 0.32. There was also a highly significant interaction ef-
fect between condition and rule-consistency, F(1, 84) = 13.1,
p < .001, MSE = 0.32, which was driven by participants in
the near condition having more certainty for rule-consistent
blocks than for rule-inconsistent blocks, suggesting that while
participants in the near-condition were better able to correctly
categorize both rule-violating and rule-consistent blocks, they
were most confident about the latter.
Additional one-sample t-tests examined whether partici-
pants scored better than would be expected by chance. For
the forced-choice task, participants correctly classified blocks
as blickets and non-blickets significantly better than chance
in the near condition, t(42) = 5.82, p < .001, but not in the
distant condition, t(42) = 1.31, p = 0.20. In the blicket rat-
ing task, however, participants classified blocks better than
chance in both the near condition, t(42) = 7.69, p < .001, and
the distant condition t(42) = 4.13, p < .001.
Finally, we looked at participants’ preference for the cor-
rect rule over their own. Participants in the distant condition
significantly preferred the correct friend’s rule over their own
rule, t(42) = 4.78, p< .001, while participants in the near con-
dition did not, t(42) = 1.55, p = .13. Participants in the distant
condition also preferred the friend’s rule significantly more
than those in the near condition, t(75) = 2.09, p = .04. This
supports our hypothesis that participants in the distant con-
dition had not previously considered the distant rule, rather
than that they considered it, but dismissed it as unlikely.
Experiment 2: A priori rule preference
Although the main study compared the extent to which par-
ticipants preferred the correct rule over their own, it did not
examine the rules in both conditions side-by-side. This study
investigated adults’ a priori preference for either the near or
the distant rule without differentiating data. This was to con-
firm that differences in causal learning and rule preference
between conditions in Experiment 1 were not due to an intu-
itive preference for the near rule before seeing any data.
Participants Participants were 51 adult US residents, re-
cruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and paid
a base rate of $0.50 for their time.
Materials and Procedure As in the previous study, partic-
ipants were told that blickets were blocks that activated the
blicket detector, and saw an animated blicket detector acti-
vating and not activating. Unlike the previous study, how-
ever, participants only saw one block placed on the machine,
causing it to activate. They were then told the two possible
rules, and that both rules accurately described this block, but
that only one rule was the correct rule for identifying blocks
that activate the machine. Participants were asked to choose
which rule they thought was more likely to be correct. These
rules were identical to the near rule and the distant rule from
the previous study, and the blicket that participants saw was
chosen from a set of blocks that conformed to both rules. Fi-
nally, after selecting a rule, participants explained why they
chose that rule and rated their confidence in their decision,
ranging from 1 (just guessing) to 7 (completely certain). This
confidence rating was turned into a score ranging from -7
(completely certain the near rule is correct) to 7 (completely
certain the distant rule is correct) for statistical analysis.
Results and Discussion Of the 51 participants, 22 pre-
ferred the near rule and 29 preferred the distant rule, p = .41,
exact binomial test. A one-sample t-test demonstrated that
the rule preference scores, M = 0.25, SE = 0.50, did not sig-
nificantly differ from chance, t(49) = 0.71, p = 0.48. Thus,
participants did not prefer one rule over the other, suggesting
that it was not an a priori preference for the near rule driving
the results of Experiment 1.
General Discussion
The findings obtained by these studies lend support to
the exploitation-biased search hypothesis. We expect that
exploitation-biased searches of the hypothesis space will be
more likely to discover rules close to the initial hypothesis,
and less likely to discover more distant rules that are equally
complex. As predicted, participants were more accurate at
classifying blocks in the near condition than the distant con-
dition. This is especially notable given that participants in Ex-
periment 2 found both rules equally a priori plausible, which
supports that the near rule is at least as complex as the dis-
tant rule. This in turn makes it less likely that the differences
between conditions can be explained by differently-weighted
prior probabilities. Participants performed better in the near
condition, where the true rule was arguably more complex,
but was comparatively easier to discover from the salient
starting point, than in the distant condition, where the true
rule was simpler, but where the salient rule was a local op-
timum. This suggests that adults are searching through their
hypothesis space in an exploitation-biased manner.
Nevertheless, participants were better able to identify rule-
consistent blocks than rule-violating ones in both tasks. This
suggests that the strength of one’s priors may still play a role
in conjunction with the exploitation bias. However, this dif-
ference in performance suggests intriguing future research
avenues—in particular, the finding in the blicket rating task
that participants in the near condition scored higher than
those in the distant condition on rule-consistent but not rule-
violating blocks. This seems to be driven largely by partici-
pants’ relative certainty toward rule-consistent blocks in the
near condition, rather than their accuracy at categorizing the
blocks (as measured by the forced choice task). Future stud-
ies might assess how nearness to an initial hypothesis affects
the certainty of judgments of causal relationships.
It is still unclear, however, if these difficulties in discov-
ering certain causal relationships are the result of a devel-
opmental process. Consequently, we plan to expand this
study to directly compare adults with children, to examine
whether children possess these same search-related difficul-
ties. If these findings are the result of a developmental shift
toward exploitation-based search strategies, then exploration-
oriented children could perform just as well—if not better—
than adults in tasks such as those in this study. For this par-
ticular study, children should perform equally well in both
experimental conditions, or perhaps even better in the distant
condition than in the near one. Particularly, this may be the
case if children see the near rule as a priori less likely.
In the future, it may be useful to develop a more explicit
process model to measure hypothesis distance. Although the
near-hypothesis rule is closer to the salient hypothesis, in that
adding and subtracting particular predicates always improves
the hypothesis toward the correct rule, this may not accurately
represent how individuals process locality. In other words,
we lack a precise model for how people move between rules,
and thus exactly how far R = (B ∩ ¬C) ∪ (¬B ∩ C) is from
R = A, and how much harder it is to find R = (A ∩ ¬B) ∪
(¬A ∩ ¬C). In future experiments, this process model will
need to be made more concrete.
Overall, our results demonstrating that adults are able to
discover a true causal structure nearer to an initial hypoth-
esis more readily than a distant causal structure of equal or
greater complexity provides compelling initial evidence for
an explore-exploit trade-off in causal inferences. This may
help inform future research on how individuals generate new
hypotheses about everyday causal interactions.
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